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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-3794 
__________ 
 
ANGELIQUE JENKINS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SEPTA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-02180) 
District Judge:  Honorable Chad F. Kenney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2020 
Before:  KRAUSE, MATEY and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 14, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Angelique Jenkins appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”).  We will 
vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 Jenkins filed a complaint under Title VII, alleging that she was discharged from 
her employment with SEPTA and was retaliated against.  Jenkins was under a “Last 
Chance Agreement” with SEPTA based on a previous incident.  She was discharged after 
opening the wrong door of a train, a safety violation.  Jenkins’ complaint seemed to 
suggest that SEPTA fired her because of a complaint she made against a custodial 
worker.1  The complaint also suggested that she was fired because of her plans to run for 
union president.   
After answering her complaint, SEPTA filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In its motion, 
SEPTA noted that Jenkins had not alleged that she was discriminated against on any 
protected basis, such as race or gender.  In her response and attached exhibits, Jenkins 
alleged that she was the “only Black Female Discharged for this rule violation.”  Dkt. #21 
at 3.  She also suggested that she was retaliated against for filing a complaint against 
SEPTA director Shwanna Rodgers, who used to be employed in SEPTA’s Labor 
Relations Department.  She repeated her allegation that she was discharged to prevent her 
from running for union office.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and 
Jenkins timely appealed. 
 
1 Jenkins and the worker had a verbal disagreement about the availability of paper towels 
at work, and the worker later vacuumed under Jenkins while she was eating her lunch. 
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of a Rule 12(c) 
motion for judgment on the pleadings under a plenary standard.  Rosenau v. Unifund 
Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008).  The standards governing Rule 12(c) motions 
are the same ones that govern motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Spruill v. Gillis, 
372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations 
removed); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Title VII claims.  
Jenkins did not make any allegation in her complaint that she was a member of a 
protected class.  The single statement in her Rule 12(c) response that she was the “only 
Black Female Discharged for this rule violation” falls far short of alleging facts that could 
support a prima facie case for a Title VII claim. 
But before dismissing a complaint, a district court “must inform the plaintiff that 
[s]he has leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.”  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The District Court did not allow Jenkins to amend her complaint.  We cannot say 
with certainty that amendment would be futile, as Jenkins made some bare allegations in 
her Rule 12(c) response, and in her brief here, that suggest that she might be able to state 
a Title VII claim or a claim for First Amendment retaliation.  See, e.g., Baloga v. Pittston 
Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752-53 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining elements of First 
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Amendment retaliation claim); Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 F.3d 242, 
247 (3d Cir. 1998) (“SEPTA is a state actor . . . [and its] actions are constrained by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for 
further proceedings. 
